

Lars Eggert

Firefox Networking



Mozilla

Browser meets network

- **HTTP:** H1, H2, H3
- **Transports:** TCP, TLS, UDP, QUIC
- **Naming:** DNS, DoH
- **Proxying:** SOCKS, MASQUE, OHTTP
- **Features:** ECH, WebSocket, WebTransport, PQC
- **Related:** Disk cache, cookies, WebRTC, WebPKI, TRR, Happy Eyeballs

Also: Security, privacy, operational aspects, performance, telemetry and OS interfaces for all of these.

smörgåsbord

Browser meets network 2025+

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- Related: **Disk cache, cookies**, WebRTC, **WebPKI, TRR, Happy Eyeballs**


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smörgåsbord

QUIC


Fast UDP I/O

- **Spotty OS support**
 - Apple: no (official) multi-message
 - Windows: buggy GSO/GRO
- **Open questions**
 - Interactions with packet pacing
 - Tuning of constants (e.g., segment size)
 - Packet batch I/O (e.g., memory management)



PLPMTUD

- **Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for Datagram Transports**
 - RFC 8899
 - “PMTUD without ICMP”
 - 1280 vs. ~1500 matters
- **Open questions**
 - How to go 1280 → PMTU in min. number of tries, esp. miss-tries?
 - (Today and in the future)



QUIC ACK frequency

- **ACKing every 2nd packet @ 1 Gbps \approx 40k ACK/s**
 - $1 \text{ Gbps} / 8 / 1500 / 2$
 - It's not quite that bad, most stacks drain RX before TX
- But still: ACK processing is expensive, esp. at server
- **Approach: sender proposes an ACK rate to receiver**
- **Open questions**
 - Relevance? Given segmentation offloading and pacing
 - Performance benefits? On high throughput connections
 - Downsides? ACK clocking, RTT sampling accuracy, ...

Congestion control

- **Slow start:** Classic, HyStart++, SEARCH or SUSS?
- **CC:** NewReno, CUBIC, BBR or else?
 - ECN with the above, or maybe L4S and Prague?
- **Open questions**
 - ^^^

Encrypted Client Hello

- TLS SNI is the last bit of plaintext
- ECH can encrypt that – but!
 - Low ECH adoption (only Cloudflare, basically)
 - Easy to block based on outer SNI
 - Needs DoH (or other encryption) to get ECH config
- **Open questions**
 - How do we get more ECH?
 - How do we get more DoH? (Or what instead of DoH?)



Anti-~~censorship~~ bad firewalling

- Firewalls introduce (non-intended) breakage
 - (Insert war stories here)
- How can we make it harder to ship bad firewalls?
- GREASE, but more
- Shipped some things to force QUIC firewalls to be smarter
 - <https://gfw.report/publications/usenixsecurity25/en/>
- **Open questions**
 - What else can we do, ideally in a way that is always-on?

Proxying

Proxying today

- Plenty of protocols
 - SOCKS
 - HTTP CONNECT
 - ...
- How to proxy HTTP/3? UDP on top of TCP?
- **Send encrypted, congestion-controlled-but-still-unreliable datagrams**
(with a fallback)

 Inner  Outer	HTTP1	HTTP2	HTTP3	WebRTC
HTTP1	now: HTTP CONNECT		now: – future: connect-udp via HTTP Capsules	now: –
HTTP2	future: connect-tcp with fallback to HTTP CONNECT			future: connect-udp via HTTP Capsules and connect-udp-listen
HTTP3	now: – future: connect-tcp with fallback to HTTP CONNECT			now: – future: connect-udp <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● via HTTP Datagrams (if QUIC Datagram extension is available) ● or HTTP Capsules and connect-udp-listen
WebRTC	never			

MASQUE

- Single & two-hop proxy (c.f., iCloud Private Relay)
- Selective proxying (web trackers, FavIcon fetch, ...)
- MASQUE vs. OHTTP
 - MASQUE: replay defense, forward secrecy
 - OHTTP: request/response, unlinkability
- Double congestion control a problem in masque
- **Open questions**
 - Performance?
 - Privacy differential?

smörgåsbord

Getting off getaddrinfo

- Want: asynchronous resolution of multiple RRs
 - esp. relevant for Happy Eyeballs v3
- Want: HTTPS records on all platforms
 - Thus more QUIC
- Want: Bypass various OS bugs
- **Open questions**
 - Operating specific optimizations

Happy Eyeballs v3

- v1 in Firefox too easily falls back to H1/H2, less QUIC/H3
- New in v3
 - **Explicit design goal: prefer IPv6 and QUIC**
 - Support for HTTPS resource records
 - Discovery of alt. endpoints, protocols (H3), ECH configs
- **Open questions**
 - Impact on connection establishment latency
 - Constant tuning (e.g., *Connection Attempt Delay*)

DoH

- Improve Trusted Recursive Resolver (TRR) program
- Fallback via *Discovery of Designated resolvers*
- Rollout on Android
- Open questions
 - Performance impact of DoH
 - Global deployment
 - Optimizations (e.g., QUIC 0-RTT)

Open telemetry

We have lots of telemetry...

- ...and some of it is already open, and you can just use it:
<https://glam.telemetry.mozilla.org>
- Much more can be made open or at least made available, please talk to us
- We care about privacy, so PII is stripped, and we enforce a resolution cap on SQL query results

EXPLORE TABLE

NORMALIZATION / By Client ID

CHANNEL / Nightly

OS / All OSes

PING TYPE / All

AGGREGATION LEVEL / Build ID

Labeled Counter

Active

DESCRIPTION

Number of paths known to be ECN capable or not-capable.

more info

AGGREGATION METHOD

sum

UNIT
n/a

EXPIRES
never

SEND IN PINGS
metrics

BUGS
bugzil.la/1902065

DATA REVIEWS
bugzil.la/1902065

NOTIFY
necko@mozilla.com
minden@mozilla.com

VIEW SQL QUERY

explore / networking.http_3_ecn_path_capability (GLEAN)

TIME HORIZON

WEEK MONTH QUARTER ALL


METRIC TYPE

PROPORTION TOTAL CLIENTS

CATEGORIES



CAPABLE BLACK-HOLE BLEACHING RECEIVED-UNSENT-ECT-1

★ REFERENCE 2025-09-26 09:00:00 570 clients 12,437 samples
 ● HOVERED 2025-09-15 21:00:00 27,208 clients 935,064 samples
 (11 days before reference) +26,638 (4673%) +922,627 (7418%)



Summary

CAT.	● HOV.	★ REF.	DIFF.
capable	57.97%	62.05%	-4.09%
bleaching	40.58%	35.98%	4.59%
black-hole	1.44%	1.96%	-0.52%
received-unsent-ect-1	0.01%	0.00%	



Thank you

 <https://github.com/mozilla/neqo>

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